Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Committee by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
12-23-1952
Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Committee
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Election Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Committee" (1952). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 341.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/341
Dec. 1952] STouT v. DEMOCRATIC CouNTY CENTRAL CoM. 91 
[40 C.2d 91; 251 P.2d 321] 
[7] Finally, it is asserted by defendants that a recovery 
could not be had for money had and received because the tax 
refund was received by Hercules, which was removed as a 
party to the action, rather than defendant. Without going into 
the question of whether the action was for money had and re-
ceived or on the contracts, it is clear that the tax refund re-
ceived by Hercules was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs 
under the agreements which provided that if the refund was 
received by Hercules, defendant would cause Hercules to as-
sign it to plaintiffs since all the stock and assets of Hercules 
had been delivered to defendant at that time pursuant to the 
agreements. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Edmonds, ,J., concurred in the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18702. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1952.] 
GREGORY S. STOUT et al., Petitioners, v. DEMOCRATIC 
COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE et al., Respond-
ents; FITZGERALD AMES et al., Real Parties in In-
terest. 
[1] Mandamus-Title to Office.-Generally, title to public office 
cannot be tried in a mandamus proceeding for the reason 
that quo warranto is an adequate remedy. 
[2] !d.-Existence of Office.-It is proper in mandamus to de-
termine whether the office claimed by a person legally exists. 
[3] !d.-Title to Office.-Title to office may be incidentally de-
termined in mandamus, and discretion rests with the court 
to determine whether the title should be so determined. 
[4] Quo Warranto-Trying Title to Office.-Generally, quo war-
ranto is appropriate only where there is involved a public 
office in the sense that the incumbent exercises some of the 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 22; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 225. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 5; Am.Jur., Quo Warranto, 
§ 22. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6] Mandamus, § 18; [4, 5] Quo 
Warranto, § 5; [7] Elections, § 34. 
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sovereign powers of government; a party committeeman is 
not such an officer because he performs duties and exercises 
powers for a particular political party rather than the sover-
eign power of the public. 
[5] Id.-Trying Title to Of!ice.-lt is doubtful whether additional 
committee mmuberships created by a majority vote of a county 
central committee pursuant to Elec. Code, § 2833, are public 
officers for the purpose of quo warranto. 
[6] Mandamus-Existence of Office.-Where the real question pre-
sented is whether there exists offices of additional committee 
memberships created by a majority vote of a county central 
committee pursuant to Elec. Code, § 2833, and title of the 
persons named to such additional offices is incidental to such 
question, mandamus is the proper remedy. 
[7] Elections-Nominations-Political Parties-County Central 
Committee.-That part of Elec. Code, § 2833, declaring that 
"The county committee in any city and county [which can 
only be San Francisco, it being the only city and county in 
the state] may increase its membership by a majority vote 
of the committee," is invalid as local and special legisla-
tion, there being no rational basis for the provision that in 
such county an unspecified additional number, above the 
number fixed as in other counties by assembly districts, may 
be appointed by the committee. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Democratic 
County Central Committee of San Francisco to revoke ap-
pointments of additional committeemen. Writ granted. 
Delauy, Fishgold & Minudri, Molly H. Minudri and Manuel 
Furtado for Petitioners. 
Albert Brundage, in pro. per., for Respondent Louise T. 
0 'Connor et al. 
Thomas E. Feeney, Robert I. McCarthy and A. J. Zirpoli 
for Respondent Committee et al., and Real Parties in Interest. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-Seven of the petitioners in this petition for 
a writ of mandate were duly elected at the June, 1952, pri-
mary election as members of the Democratic County Central 
Committee for the City and County of San Francisco; one 
petitioner, Collins, is an ex officio member by reason of sec-
tion 2838 of the Elections Code which makes the nominee of 
the party for state senator or the incumbent of the nominees 
of the party for the assembly ex officio a member of the county 
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central committee. Respondents are the Democratic County 
Central Committee and 23 duly elected members of the com-
mittee. Designated as real parties in interest are 25 persons 
who, after the primary election, were appointed by a ma-
jority of the committee to serve as additional committee 
members pursuant to section 2833 of the Elections Code.1 
Charging that the italicized portion of section 2833, supra, 
violates various provisions of the Constitution forbidding local 
and special laws (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; art. IV, § 25 ( 9)), 
petitioners assert that the real parties in interest are unlaw-
fully holding the position of committeemen and request that 
the committee be ordered by a writ of mandate to revoke their 
appointment. 
Respondents claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy 
here; that quo warranto is; and that section 2833 of the 
Elections Code, S1lpra, is valid. 
[1] Turning first to the question of remedy, it may be 
said generally that title to public office cannot be tried in a 
mandamus proceeding (Nicler v. City Comrm:ss1:on, 36 Cal. 
App.2d 14, 26 [97 P.2d 293]; Black v. Boarcl of Pol1:cc 
Commrs., 17 Cal.App. 310 [119 P. 674]; Meredith v. Boarcl 
of Supervisors, 50 Cal. 433; H urnburg v. Boarcl of Police & 
Fire Cornrnrs., 27 Cal.App. 6 [148 P. 802]; People v. Baney, 
30 Cal.App. 581 [158 P. 1036] ; People v. Olds, 3 Cal. 167 
[58 Am.Dec. 398]; 16 CaLTur. 792) for the reason that quo 
warranto is an adequate remedy. There are, however, many 
limitations on that rule and it cannot be applied in all cases. 
(See 22 Cal.Jur. 792 et seq.; 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 189, 211.) 
Various reasons are given for the rule, such as that where 
there are two claimants for the office, one 'would not be a 
party in the mandamus proceeding and complete relief could 
not be given, and that when title to a public office is involved, 
sovereign power by quo warranto should be invoked in prefer-
ence to private interests in order to avoid undue interference 
with government. (See High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 
§ 49 et seq.; People v. Olds, supra, 3 Cal. 167.) [2] Con-
sidering the foregoing factors, it has been held proprr in man-
damus to determine whether the office claimed by a person 
"'In any city and county the county central committee of eacl1 party 
shall be elected by each assembly district and shall consist of five mem-
bers from each assembly district in the city and county. The cottnty 
committee in any city and county may increase its mernbership by a 
majority vote of the committee.'' (Italics added.) (Elections Code, 
§ 2833.) 
94 STOUT v. DEMOCRATIC CouNTY CENTRAL CoM. [40 C.2d 
legally exists. (Spau,lding v. Desmond, 188 Cal. 783 [207 P. 
896] .) [3] 'fitle to office may be incidentally determined 
in mandamus (McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711 [91 P. 598, 
121 Arn.St.Rep. 146, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 661] ; Bannerman v. Boyle, 
160 Cal. 197 [116 P. 732]; Brennan v. Riley, 3 Cal.2d 736 [46 
P.2d 972] ; Klose v. S11pe1·ior Cmtrt, 96 Cal.App.2d 913 [217 
P.2d 97]) and discretion rests with the court to determine 
whether the title should be so determined. (McKannay v. 
Horton, supra, 151 Cal. 711; Klose v. Superior Court, supra, 
96 Cal. A pp.2d 913.) [ 4] Generally, quo warranto is appro-
priate only where there is involved a public office in the sense 
that the incumbent exercises some of the sovereign powers of 
government (Co1tlter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181 [201 P. 120]; 
People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636 [107 P.2d 
388]; Leyrnel v. Johnson, 105 Cal.App. 694 [288 P. 858] ), 
and it has been held that a party committeeman is not such 
an officer because he performs duties and exercises powers 
for a particular political party rather than the sovereign 
power of the public (Tuck v. Cotton, 175 Ark. 409 [299 S.W. 
613] ; People v. Bracly, 302 Ill. 576 [135 N.E. 87] ; Attorney 
General v. D1·ohan, 169 Mass. 534 [ 48 N.E. 279, 61 Arn.St.Rep. 
301] ; contra Dashtgne v. Cohen, 14 La.App. 475 [131 So. 
746]; klorris v. Peters, 203 Ga. 350 [46 S.E.2d 729] ). We 
recognize, of course, that such committeemen perform impor-
tant duties as a means through which the right of suffrage is 
exercised (Independent Prog1·essive Party v. County Clerks, 
31 Cal.2c1 549 [191 P.2d 6]) and primaries are a part of the 
election process (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d 592, 596 [226 P.2d 
1]). 
[5] In the instant case we have only one claimant to each 
of the ''offices'' (the additional committee memberships 
created) and it is doubtful that they are public officers for the 
purpose of quo warranto. [6] The real question presented 
is whether those offices exist at all, because their existence 
depends upon the validity of the italicized portion of section 
2833 of the Elections Code, sttpra. 'rhe title of the persons 
named to those additional offices is incidental to that main 
question. \Ve hold, therefore, that mandamus is the proper 
remedy. 'l'he case of JJlalone v. S1tperior Cmtrt, (Cal.App.)* 
249 P .2d 324 (Oct. 30, 1952), being out of harmony with these 
views is disapproved. 
[7] Concerning the validity of section 2833, it appears 
that it applies only to cities and counties. There is only 
·»A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on December 19, 1952. 
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one city and county in the state, namely, San Francisco, 
and it is the only place where the membership of the county 
central committee may be increased and the additional mem-
bers appointed by the committee. The law applicable to 
other counties is as follows: In counties with four assembly 
districts the committee is elected by supervisor districts, 
five members for each district (Elec. Code, § 2835.5); in 
counties with less than four assembly districts the committee 
is elected by supervisor districts, the number being based 
on a formula applied to the number of votes cast at the 
last gubernatorial election but not less than 21 members 
( id. § 2837) ; in counties with 20 or more assembly districts 
there are seven members for each district ( id. § 2834) ; in 
counties with more than five and less than 20 assembly 
districts there are five members for each district ( id. § 2835) . 
.Assembly districts are established on the basis of popula-
tion distribution. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 6.) Thus the 
number of committeemen are apportioned according to pop-
ulation as determined by the Legislature, and are chosen 
by the electorate except in San Francisco. We can see no 
rational basis for such a classification. While it is true that 
the other counties in the state are classified according to the 
number of assembly districts, or the voters at the last elec-
tion, which may be a reasonable basis, there is no basis for 
the selection of one county in the state, and provision that 
in such county, an unspecified additional number, above the 
number fixed as in the other counties by assembly districts, 
may be appointed by the committee. There is no conceivable 
reason why the number and nonlegislative ascertainment 
thereof should be different. There is no reasonable relation 
between the method of ascertaining the number and the 
population or the fact that San Francisco City and County 
is a compact area with little or no rural territory. The 
recent case of Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 
562], is closely in point. We there held a statute which 
limited the number of notaries public in San Francisco was 
an invalid special and local law. We there said : ''The legis-
lation on its face expressly chooses without reason to limit 
the number of notaries for one county, and one county only, 
thus leaving no room for the presumption of constitutionality 
or for the presumption that the Legislature had a conceiv-
ably rational basis for the limitation on the number of notaries 
for San Francisco, or the presumption of constitutionality 
from the long existence of the statute without attack. . .. " 
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''The most recent expression by this court in regard to 
special and local laws, and what constitutes a proper basis 
for the classification of counties, is contained in Consolidated 
P1·inting & Publ. Co. v. Allen, 18 Cal.2d 63 [112 P.2d 884]. 
'l'here the statute provided a method for the publication of 
delinquent tax lists for counties of the first class (Los An-
geles is the only county of that class) different from that 
for all other counties. In holding the statute invalid this 
court said: 'We find no natural, intrinsic, or constitutional 
ground of distinction between the county of Los Angeles 
and other counties which would justify the application of 
a special procedure with reference to the sale of delinquent 
property.' " 
We hold, therefore, that the italicized portion of section 
2833 of the Elections Code, supra, is invalid, and it is ordered 
that a peremptory writ of mandate issue, commanding re-
spondents to revoke the appointment of the additional mem-
bers to the Democratic Central Committee for San Francisco 
City and County. Each party shall pay his own costs in this 
proceeding. Pursuant to stipulation the writ issued hereunder 
may be served upon counsel for respondents and real parties 
in interest in lieu of service on each respondent and real party 
in interest. Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue forth-
with. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, ,J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-That mandate lies solely to compel the 
performance of a duty especially enjoined by law is well 
established. (Spaulding v. Desmond, 188 Cal. 783, 789 [207 
P. 896], and cases cited therein.) I dissented in Hollman v. 
W an·en, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562], on the ground that 
the petitioner failed to establish a clear legal duty upon the 
governor to consider her application. In the present case, 
the petitioners have even less basis for the position that the 
elected members of the committee have a duty to revoke the 
appointments made by them pursuant to the challenged code 
section. The only purpose of this proceeding is to compel 
them to do so. Even if it be conceded that the statute is un-
constitutional, no showing is made that the committee has a 
clear legal duty to revoke the appointments. 
I would, therefore, deny the peremptory writ. 
